

BRIEFING ON CURRENT FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEMS

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 5, 1963

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:40 a.m., in room S-116, U.S. Capitol Building, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright (presiding), and Senators, Morse, Lausche, Church, Symington, Smathers, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Mundt.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, and Mr. Henderson of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we had better get under way. We are very pleased this morning to have the Secretary of State to brief us on the current situation, I suppose, in the various areas. This he will do in his usual masterly fashion, so you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much.

First, may I say how much I appreciate the courtesy of the committee in moving the hearing from yesterday to today. I had failed to show on the same occasion a year ago, and I felt I could not do so this time. The weather prediction caused me to take a train yesterday morning.

Mr. Chairman, I would like, rather than to take the committee's time in an inordinate manner with a general review, to make some comments on 3 or 4 matters of major importance, particularly in the NATO and the Soviet Union areas, and then let the discussion develop on the basis of questions by the committee with respect to other parts of the world. I also am intending to get into some nuclear questions.

NEED FOR BRIEFING ON NUCLEAR SITUATION

I would strongly urge the committee, Mr. Chairman, to have a full and top secret briefing on the nuclear situation. I do not believe this committee has had that full briefing. I think it is very important that it have it because the situation has changed considerably in the past few years, both from the point of view of the Soviet Union and that of the United States.

We could arrange this in 2 chapters to suit the convenience of the committee. We could have a partial briefing here in Wash-

for us in the Free World. If this would mean, for example, a freer hand for the Chinese in Southeast Asia or if it meant a more aggressive attitude by the Soviets themselves in situations like Berlin or any resumption of a more aggressive weapons program in Cuba, questions of that sort that would create problems for us. So I think that the discussions that are going on now, and for the next 2 months, in Moscow will be of great importance and would be worth very close examination.

POINTS OF AGREEMENT WITH SOVIETS

We have in this period been giving some thought to whether there are any points whatever on which some agreement with the Soviet Union could be reached as far as the West is concerned. If there were some clear points on which it would be in our own interest to reach agreement, we would think that this might be a timely moment in which to establish that fact.

But I must say that at the moment the prospect is not encouraging. We have talked about the nuclear test ban matter.

We, with the full knowledge of the French and the British and the Germans, have put to the Soviet Union the possibilities of an agreement against the transfer of nuclear weapons to other national capabilities in which one paragraph would make this commitment on behalf of the existing nuclear powers, and another paragraph would have everyone else sign up that they would not receive such weapons and not manufacture them. This is showing no progress at all.

SOVIET POSITION ON LAOS

In the case of Laos, Mr. Khrushchev told Mr. Harriman, I think you perhaps have already had a report on this, that he was supporting the Geneva Accord, but that he had made a commitment on behalf of a third party, and that this is not very easy. In other words, he tried to leave the impression that he was not necessarily in full control of the situation.

Senator SYMINGTON. What do you mean by the third party?

Secretary RUSK. The third party being the North Vietnam or Pathet Lao or someone down there, you see.

We are going to push very hard on the Laos question because there was a point where they did make a flat and public and clear commitment about an independent and neutral Laos.

We can understand the possibility that Mr. Khrushchev might have lost some of his influence, if not all of it, among the Pathet Lao, but we have not been able to understand the attitude of the Polish representative on the ICC^s who has been entirely uncooperative in the last month in carrying out the clear responsibilities of the ICC under the Geneva Accords.

We have hit the Poles very hard on this directly, as well as through Moscow. They have brought their representative on the ICC back to Warsaw. We had a report this morning that he was going back to Laos with instructions to be more cooperative. But if the Soviets cannot control the Pathet Lao possibly, at least, they

^s International Control Commission.

ought to be able to control the Polish delegate to the ICC, so we look upon that as something of a test.

SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL IN CUBA

On Cuba we continue to press them on the business of Soviet military personnel. I would not wish to offer this comment to this committee as firm information this morning, but the Soviets have been telling us in public broadcasts, as well as in very informal conversation, that their combat units are not there, that their military personnel are training, and so forth.

I think you would be interested in the fact that we have, through intelligence on the ground, largely confirmed this in connection with one of their camps where one of those battalion combat teams were present.

We have taken steps in the last, well including this morning we have taken steps, to check on some of the other camps to see if we could discern any significant change there. We are not buying this information yet, but they are trying to create the impression that the organized combat units are not there; that the military personnel are there on a training basis.

We have continued to push them on the fact that any military presence there is contrary to our own policy, and the policy of the hemisphere, and any such presence is a major obstacle to any improvement of relations between ourselves and Moscow.

So we do not see particular points—there is no give on Berlin, for example, although they have been doing very little about Berlin in recent months.

Unless we were to move on some such point as going ahead with the civil air transport agreement that would provide 2 or 3 flights a week as between New York and Moscow or some relatively minor point of that sort, we see very little prospect of finding points in which there is a genuine agreement.

NATO-WARSAW PACT NONAGGRESSION TREATY

The Soviets have raised the question of a NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression treaty. In the West we have always looked upon this as something which had come at the end of the trail when a number of other important matters had been buttoned up. Otherwise, such an arrangement would be false and fictitious and might also be misleading as far as the West was concerned, and the attitude of Western public opinion. It is a matter of no great substance. The Soviets themselves say it is a matter of no great substance, but they have, on occasion, said that psychologically it would be a good thing if something like this could be done.

On the substance of a Warsaw-NATO Pact treaty, we almost never have a meeting of NATO without reaffirming the defensive nature of NATO, and saying the kind of things which the Soviets would like to put in treaty form. But we are skeptical of that, and inclined not to go through just the motions at the present time.

I think if we moved in that direction and had a Berlin crisis 2 or 3 weeks later we would all feel and look like fools, and we have no assurances from the Soviet Union that they are not going to precipitate a Berlin crisis at a moment of their own choosing.

FORMOSA AND OKINAWA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. With regard to the question which Senator Symington just asked about Formosa, it seems to me that in the Orient there are two glittering, shining spots which are compared to Berlin, and which are sores in the physical area of Communist influence. One is Formosa, which has made some of the most astounding and startling economic advancements over there—land reform, economic and industrial development and everything else—that have been made in the world, outside of Western Europe. The other is Okinawa which has come from sort of an aboriginal distance prior to World War II, to where it is quite a modern area under American tutelage. It seems to me they are very, very important. They are pretty much of a sore spot in the Communist World.

Secretary RUSK. There is no question about both those places.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I cannot brag too much about South Korea.

Secretary RUSK. I think that is correct.

Senator SYMINGTON. You may proceed, Mr. Secretary.

SITUATION IN INDONESIA

Secretary RUSK. Perhaps we should get to this at another meeting, but I think it is going to be interesting to see what happens in Indonesia in the weeks and months ahead, because the shift of the Communist Party in Indonesia to Peiping has helped to stir up the fears among a lot of Indonesians toward China, and we found this has come up in discussions between the Malayans, the Filipinos and the Indonesians, about the possibility of some sort of a loose political association.

It has also had some bearing on our recent oil negotiations with Sukarno where we came to a settlement which the companies are very pleased about, and where in the background was the China threat, and there was the fact that we made it very clear to Indonesia that this was a matter of effect fundamentally on our whole relationship with Indonesia.

Senator SYMINGTON. Could I ask right there, it is extremely interesting, is Sukarno apprehensive about the Communist Party moving toward China?

Secretary RUSK. He is very apprehensive about China and he is very frank, talking about this with the Filipinos and Malayans, and recently with Wilson Wyatt.⁷

He has not been that frank before because he thought he was tied in with Moscow, you see. So it is just possible there could be some further development in that situation that would not be too bad from our point of view.

You notice there have been some anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia, and this has been embarrassing to the Communist Party there.

⁷ Former Lt. Gov. of Kentucky, sent by President Kennedy to renegotiate American oil contracts with Indonesia.

CONFISCATION AND EXPROPRIATION IN INDONESIA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not want the record to at least fail to touch upon the fact that a certain amount of personal horn tooting ought to be done about a little amendment we put in last year with respect to confiscation and expropriation which had something to do with Sukarno making an arrangement over there.

Secretary RUSK. Perhaps I should apologize for not mentioning that particular amendment, because that amendment, in the background, was a very useful piece in our discussion with the Indonesians on it. But I do think that amendment is, at its best, in the preventive stage rather than in the operational stage.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. As prevention it was quite effective.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The preventive stage is what it is for.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Can I just mention one question about Cuba?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I want to say there is some place in the Bible that says—off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

AERIAL INSPECTIONS OF CUBA

Senator SYMINGTON. Have we resumed on-site inspection in Cuba, low-level airplane inspection and, if not, do we plan to?

Secretary RUSK. While I was sitting here this morning, sir, I had a note that 4 planes were in and out, and there was no reaction. This is low-level.

Senator SYMINGTON. Low-level?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir. But I would appreciate it if you—if Cuba does not make this public, we may not, so I would appreciate if you would keep this private.

Senator AIKEN. Our planes?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Are these the first ones?

Secretary RUSK. The first ones in some time. But this is apart—

Senator SYMINGTON. The first ones for months?

Secretary RUSK. I do not know when the last one was. It was a couple of months ago.

Senator AIKEN. We had to wait for Castro to get home. [Laughter.]

Secretary RUSK. This was a part of checking in those other Soviet camps.

Senator SYMINGTON. It is sure pleasant to talk to you. You make me feel better.

Senator AIKEN. Some time we would like a little more information.

[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the committee adjourned.]